INTRODUCTION

ON
May 23, 196o, Prime Minister David Ben Gurion of Israel announced in the Knesseth (Israel's Parliament) that Adolf Eichmann had been found. Eichmann, had, in fact, been living under an assumed name in Argentina and had been brought to Israel without the knowledge or consent of the Government of Argentina. The circumstances of his "transportation" to Israel are not fully known, but it seems that he was apprehended by an Israeli commando squad in Suarez on the outskirts of Buenos Aires on May II, kept under lock and key in a private house for some nine days, and spirited away to Israel on an El Al plane that had brougth Israel's Minister of Security, Abba Eban, to Argentina on May 20. The ostensible purpose of Mr. Eban's visit was to represent Israel at Argentina's Independence Day celebrations. On May 21, 196o, the El Al plane returned to Israel with Eichmann, but without Mr. Eban.
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In Israel, Mr. Eichmann was charged with "crimes against the Jewish people" and "crimes against humanity" under the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law of August i, 195o. He is presently being tried under these charges by the District Court of Jerusalem.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the legality of the Eichmann trial under Israeli law and under international law. While this dis- cussion necessarily has to proceed from the assumption that the factual allegations of the prosecution are substantially correct and susceptible to legal proof, no opinion is expressed as to the facts. It need hardly be added that this would be highly improper at the present time.
I THE LEGALITY OF TE EICHMANN TRIAL UNDER ISRAELI LAW
Adolf Eichmann is being tried under the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, which was adopted by the Knesseth on August i, 1950.2 Section one of this Law provides that any person who has "done, during the period of the Nazi regime, in an enemy country, an act constituting a crime against the Jewish people" or an "act constituting a crime against humanity" or "an act constituting a war crime" is liable to the death penalty. All three crimes are more closely defined in section i (b).3 While according to section seven of the Law, the general provisions of the Penal Code apply to offenses under the Law, section eight expressly excludes the applicability of sections sixteen to nineteen of the Penal Code, which relate to the defense of the exercise of judicial function, constraint, necessity, and justification. 4 Nevertheless, section eleven provides that under special circumstances, facts that but for section eight would have been valid defenses may be taken into account by way of mitigation of punishment. But even then, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for ten years is mandatory for section one offenses. committed with intent to destroy the Jewish people in whole or in part: (x) killing Jews5 (2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to Jews; (3) placing Jews in living conditions calculated to bring about their physical destructioni (4) imposing measures intended to prevent births among Jews; (5) forcibly transferring Jewish children to another national or religious groups5 (6) destroying or desecrating Jewish religious or cultural assets or values; (7) inciting to hatred of Jews." Crimes against humanity are defined as "murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation or deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, and
No prescription runs for section one offenses, and "the Court may deviate from the rules of evidence if it is satisfied that this will promote the ascertainment of truth and the just trial of the case" under section 15(a).
In a decision of March 23, 1953 , the District Court of Tel Aviv had this to say of the 1950 law: 5 . .. this law is fundamentally different in its characteristics, in the legal and moral principles underlying it and in its spirit, from all other criminal enactments usually found on the Statute books. The Law is retroactive and extraterritorial and its object, inter alia, is to provide a basis for the punishment of crimes which are not comprised within the criminal law of Israel, being the special consequence of the Nazi regime and its persecutions....
In other words, the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law is highly unusual; it is retroactive and extraterritorial in effect. Add to that the fact that Eichmann was forcibly abducted from Argentina to be tried under this unusual, retroactive, and extraterritorial law, and you have, in a nutshell, the main legal issues presented. They are: At the present, we are dealing with these questions on the level of Israeli internal law. On this level, questions (2) and (3), relating to retroactivity and exterritorial application, require but little discussion. Israel does not as yet have a written constitution including a bill of rights, but only some organic acts dealing with the establishment and functions of the Knesseth, the President's office, and the Cabinet.' The chief organ of state is the Knesseth; its will is supreme. There is no judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation,' and as a matter of the internal law of Israel, the 195o Law is binding upon Israeli courts. They cannot but apply it in all cases coming properly before them.
But is the Eicharn case properly before the District Court of Jerusalem? Here, we deal with question (I): can criminal jurisdiction be obtained through the forcible abduction of the accused from a foreign jurisdiction, in violation at least of the law of that latter jurisdiction? Again, this question will, at this point, have to be discussed as one of Israeli law.
The We are, then, faced with a question of fact. Were Eichmann's abductors bona fide volunteers acting without the previous knowledge or consent of the Government of Israel, or were they agents of the Government of Israel? The evidence would appear to point very strongly in the latter direction. Let us therefore assume, for the sake of argument, that Eichmann was, in fact, forcibly abducted by agents of the Government of Israel, acting on Argentinian territory without the consent of Argentina. This abduction constituted an international tort. What were its consequences?
Every state that commits an international tort against another state is bound by customary international law to make reparation therefor." 9 While there is great uncertainty in international law as to the form of reparation, 20 it seems well established by state practice that the state on whose territory a purported fugitive from justice has been forcibly abducted by agents of another state can demand of the latter the return of the person abducted, and the disciplinary or criminal punishment of the abductors. A parallel to this right to the return of the person abducted, who does not have to be a national of the state of asylum, exists in international prize law: enemy vessels seized by a belligerent within neutral territorial waters must be restored to their owners on the application of the neutral power concerned. 22 Argentina could, then, demand from Israel the return of Eichmann -unless there is a valid reason for Israel to reject such a demand. The Government of Argentina had near the end of World War II announced its willingness to surrender for trial any Axis or Fascist war criminals seeking asylum within its territory. 2 3 If we assume that this general obligation undertaken in exchange for membership in the United Nations still subsisted when the State of Israel was established, it might be argued that Argentina was at least under an inchoate duty [Vol. iggx : 400 to extradite Eichmann to Israel. For Argentina had, in principle, agreed that war criminals should be punished, and its own penal legislation precludes the prosecution of Eichmann for acts alleged to have been committed before May 8, I945.A The proper forum for those offenses would be a state that still has legislation enabling its courts to punish World War II war crimes as such5 and so far as can be ascertained, Israel is the only state in the world that has such legislation. 25 Therefore, even if Israel could not demand the extradition of Eichmann as of right, Eichmann's trial in Israel is in harmony with Argentina's legal obligations toward the United Nations.
This line of argument is rather tenuous. But a decision on its merits is unnecessary in the instant case, for while Argentina did, indeed, assert that Israel was obliged to make reparation by way of return of Eichmann to the custody of Argentina, the Eichmann dispute between Israel and Argentina was settled in a different manner. Argentina, feeling that reparation was not forthcoming through direct negotiations with Israel, brought the Eichmann case before the United Nations Security Council. It presented a draft resolution requesting the Government of Israel to "make appropriate reparation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law. '26 The Security
Council debated the Eiclzmat case on June 22 and 23, 196o, and adopted a resolution incorporating the operative paragraph as requested, 27 but not until after it had been strongly-and in the end, successfully-suggested that Argentina should not insist on the return of Eichmann, but accept a public apology instead.
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The latter, incidentally, was more than appropriate even if the abductors had not been "Subject to minor exceptions not here material, Argentinian penal law only applies to offenses committed on Argentinian territory. Penal Code of 19zi, Art. 1; MEDIANO, JIMINEZ DE ASUA, and PECO, eds., LEYES PENALES COMENTADAS 39 (1946 In conclusion, it is submitted that even if Eichmann were, in fact, forcibly abducted by agents of the Government of Israel acting on the territory of Argentina without the latter's consent, this would no longer vitiate the legality of Eichmann's trial by Israel. The claim to have Eichmann returned was Argentina's alone to make or to renounce. By settling for a public apology, Argentina has validly renounced any claim for the return of Eichmann. The at least rather strong possibility that an international tort was committed by the abduction of Eichmann from Argentina will, therefore, no longer affect the legality of the trial of Eichmann by an Israeli court.
B. Can Israel Try Eichmann for Acts Committed Before I945
Under a Statute Enacted in 1950? Objections against Eichmann's subjection to retroactive penal legislation can be raised (i) by the state entitled under international law to protect him; (2) possibly by Eichmann himself.
i. Claims by the state of Eichmann's nationality a. Procedural aspects. Which state is entitled to protect Eichmann under international law?
The general rule is that the state of which an individual is a national is entitled to protect him against acts violative of international law. As the Permanent Court of International Justice stated, "by taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights-its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law." 0 Eichmann was born of German parents in Germany in 19o6. However, around 191o, his family moved to Linz, in Austria; and it seems reasonable to assume that Adolf Eichmann acquired Austrian nationality by naturalization. At any rate, he joined the Austrian Nazi party, and even after coming to Germany in 1933, he first saw service in the Austrian Nazi legion then being trained in Bavaria. 31 If Adolf Eichmann acquired Austrian nationality by naturalization, he thereby lost ' See Clarke, op. cit. supra note i, at 3-25.
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his German nationality under section twenty-five of the German Nationality Act of I9r3.32 He probably re-acquired German nationality by individual naturalization or, in accordance with article fourteen or fifteen of the Nationality Act, by becoming a Prussian or German state servant0 (the Gestapo was originally a Prussian, not a Reich organization). In either event, he lost his Austrian nationality. 34 Eichmann is, then, a German national by naturalization. Since 1945, he has been mostly resident outside Germany, as a fugitive from justice, and under an assumed name. His basic identification paper seems to be a stateless person's identity card, issued by the Vatican in 1947 to "Richard Klementz." 35' While his application for such an identity paper is not sufficient ground for the loss of German nationality, 3 ' there nevertheless is the question whether in view of Eichmann's own dissociation from Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (the only state with which Israel maintains official relations),1 is entitled to protect him. The International Court of Justice has stated in the Nottebohm case that mere formal nationality is not a sufficient link for the exercise of international protection, but that nationality for this purpose has to be "real and effective, as the exact juridical expression of a social fact. 
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of Germany is not entitled to exercise its right of diplomatic protection over Adolf Eichmann. However, it seems doubtful whether link theory developed in the Nottebohm case expresses an accepted rule of customary international law. 3 9 Even if it did not, there would still be the fact that the Federal Republic, far from objecting to the exercise of Israel's jurisdiction over Eichmann, has officially welcomed the prosecution of Eichmann by Israel, and has offered its assistance for the obtaining of evidence. Thus, the Federal Republic has attempted to relinquish its possible right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of Eichmann. But the difficulty is, as astute counsel for Eichmann have lost no time in finding out, that the public law of the Federal Republic of Germany, as contradistinguished from the public law of probably all other countries, 40 affords a German national a legal right for diplomatic protection against other states, and that this right is enforceable through proceedings against the Foreign Office before administrative courts.
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It may well be doubted, however, whether an attempt to obtain an administrative court decision ordering the Federal Government to intercede on behalf of Eichmann would in the end be successful. For one thing, the "qink" theory would arise again, this time on the level of German administrative law. It may well be held that as a matter of German administrative law, Eichmann has, by obtaining a stateless person's passport in 1947, and by never registering with a consular or diplomatic agency of the Federal Republic, forfeited (verwirkt) his claim to diplomatic protection. 4 2 Even if this conclusion is avoided, the claim to protection is, as Wilhelm Karl Geck has shown in his incisive study, merely an entitlement to an objective determination whether, under consideration of all the circumstances, including the interests of the nation as a whole and the present state of diplomatic relations, the right of protection should be exercised. 48 The exercise of the right is [Vol. i96i: 400 still discretionary, but the discretion of the Government is subject to review. The minimum requirement for an entitlement to protection is that international law has, in fact, been violated. 44 raArt. ii, § z: "No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed." UNITED NATIONS, YEAR BOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR 194) 466, 467 (1950) .
"'Art. i3: "(1) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.
(2) Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations."
UNITED NATIONS, YEAR BOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR 1952 4241 427 (1954).
" Art. 7: "No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.
This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." UNITED NATIONS, YEAR r7 See text at note 5, supra.
[ Vol. 1961 1"400 substance. It is true that no Israeli law provided for the punishment of crimes against the Jewish people and crimes against humanity before May 8, 1945. But with some exceptions not material in this connection, the acts defined as such crimes were punishable under German law and, where committed outside of Germany, Polish or Soviet law, at the time of their comission. So long as prosecution is limited to acts punishable under German or local law prior to 1945, there is no substantive retroactivity. Until the coming into effect of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, German penal law knew the death penalty for offenses against life 58 it therefore would seem that with respect to the actual offenses charged, there will also be no danger of a retroactive imposition of a more severe penalty.
The fact that the 195o Law is not retroactive with respect to the offenses charged is best illustrated by post-World War II war crimes trials in Germany. tribunals were staffed with American lawyers and judges, including, for instance, Judge Musmanno, now of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
In several cases, the defendants argued that Control Council Law No. io was retroactive as applied to them. This defense was rejected by the courts on the theory of substantive nonretroactivity--i.e., the theory that the acts charged, especially crimes against humanity, were punishable under law existing at the time of their commission. 2 It might be argued that these decisions are not overly persuasive, because the courts were bound by Control Council Law No. 1O, whether retroactive or not, and that the Nuremberg trials are, at least to some extent, tainted with the suspicion of victors' justice. But it should be noted that while German lawyers, on the whole, were and are largely critical of the notion of crimes against peace as applied to acts committed before May 8, 1945, they seem in substantial agreement that the punishment of "crimes against humanity" was not, strictly speaking, retroactive. At least, this is the opinion of Professor Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, one of Germany's most eminent authorities on international penal law. 4 Furthermore, by virtue of enactment by the Occupying Powers, Control Council Law No. 1O was effective as a German statute. Consequently, there was no retroactive imposition of a penalty for an act not punishable under German law, even if committed before May.8, 1945. On balance, therefore, it seems quite clear that at least with respect to the serious offenses against life charged under the law of i95o, there is no substantive retroactivity entailing the possibility of violation of international law.
Eicm mran's international human rights
Eichmann's subjection to the 1950 law is not, then, a violation of rights under customary international law that the Federal Republic of Germany is entitled to protect. But is it a violation of international human rights that Eichmann can claim in his own name, and that Israel has to respect? "See especially United States v. Ohlendorf, 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 411, 459 (1948) : "In the main, the defendants in this case are charged with murder. Certainly no one can claim with the slightest pretense at reasoning that there is any taint of ex post fac sm in the law of murder." See also id. at 496-500, especially 499.
" See generally BENTON & GRIMM, eds., NUREMBERG, GERMAN VIEWS OF THE WAR TRIALS (1955). O'JESCHECK, DIE VERANTWORTLICHKEIT DER STAATSORGANE NACH VOLKER-STRAFRECHT, EINE STUDIE ZU DEN NURNBERGER PROZESSEN 373 (195.).
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It seems highly doubtful at this time whether there are internationally protected human rights outside of specific treaty rights 0 5 But even if we assume that individuals are, to some extent, subjects of international law and may assert internationally protected human rights on their own behalf, it does not follow that Eichmann's human rights have been violated. Quite to the contrary, the only two instruments designed to afford legal recognition of international human rights, the Draft Covenant of Civil and Political Rights of the United Nations and the European Convention on Fundamental Freedoms, both provide that the prohibition of retroactive penal legislation incorporated in these instruments "shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized" by "civilized nations" or "the community of nations." 6 Thus, even if international law presently recognizes fundamental human rights that can be asserted by individuals directly in the absence of treaty, the present substantive content of these rights would not preclude the so-called retroactive application of the Law of 1950 to the offenses charged against Adolf Eichmann.
It is therefore submitted that Israel can, without violating international law, try Adolf Eichmann for acts alleged to have been committed before May 8, 1945s, under the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law of August I, 1950 . At the outset, we would do well in abandoning any notion of the so-called territoriality of criminal laws 0 7 While it is true, on the choiceof-law level, that every country in the world imposes penal sanctions only on the basis of its own penal law, the notion that states may punish only offenses actually or at least constructively committed on their territories is merely a rule of Anglo-American internal criminal law, which again, of course, is subject to many exceptions. 8 The most that can be said is that every country applies only its own penal law, and every country punishes-subject to exceptions dictated by diplomatic or sovereign immunity-all offenses committed on its own territory. But virtually all systems of criminal law reach much further. First, most or all states, including Great Britain and the United States, punish violations " Lotus" Case, P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. io, at z8-xg; 20 (France v. Turkey, 1927) :
"the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that -failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it may not exercise its power in any form in the teritory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or convention. It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to States to extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, and if, as an exception to this general prohibition, it allowed States to do so in certain specific cases. But this is certainly not the case under international law as it stands at present. Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rulesi as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which is regards as best and most suitable. . . . Though it is true that in all systems of law the principle of the territorial character of criminal law is fundamental, it is equally true that all or nearly all these systems of law extend their action to offences committed outside the territory of the State which adopts them, and they do so in ways which vary from State to State. The territoriality of criminal law, therefore, is not an absolute principle of international law and by no means coincides with territorial sovereignty." [Vol. 1961 : 400 of their penal laws by their public officials and armed forces abroad," 9 treasonable acts by their own nationals, and some offenses against state security even when committed by foreigners abroad. 7 ' Secondly, many continental states punish certain offenses committed by their nationals abroad; some, for instance, Germany, go so far as to make their penal codes applicable to virtually all offenses by their own nationals, wherever committed. 71 Nobody earnestly contends that these extensions of the reach of criminal laws to offenses committed abroad are contrary to international law.
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Criminal jurisdiction based on territorality, nationality, and state protection, then, is manifestly not contrary to public international law. The same is true of criminal jurisdiction based on a permissive or directive rule of international law-i.e., the rule that pirates may and shall be punished wherever aprehended, or treaty-based rules for the prosecution of counterfeiting, white and black slave traffic, traffic in narcotic drugs and in pornographic literature, etc. 73 The only question that is seriously open to dispute is whether the general-protective principlei.e., the punishment of offenses against nationals of the prosecuting state wherever and by whomever committed-and the principle of enforcement by proxy-4.e., the punishment of offenses wherever and by whomever committed, so long as they are punishable both under the lex loci and the lex fori--are compatible with public international law.
In alleged to have been committed by Adolf Eichmann. Is it directly applicable here? While the acts charged would constitute the crime of genocide under the Convention on Genocide, which is in force as between all states here concerned, this convention expressly provides in article six that persons charged with genocide "shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which have accepted its jurisdiction. ' 74 This excludes the direct applicability of the Genocide Convention. It seems dear, though, that this jurisdictional clause is permissive, not exclusive." The Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Act, adopted by the Knesseth on March 29, 195o, expressly provides that "a person committing outside Israel an act which is an offense under this Act may be prosecuted and punished in Israel as if he had committed the act in Israel.
1 7 6 Nevertheless, this Israeli Act is prospective in operation only and does not extend to acts committed before its coming into force. Thus, the Genocide Convention does not apply because of its jurisdictional limitations, and the Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Act does not apply because it is prospective in operation only.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Genocide Convention as such, especially its provision in article one that the contracting parties confirm "that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish," lends strong support to the contention that Israel has at least an imperfect duty under international law to punish acts constituting genocide, even if committed in the past. Such a duty, or even a permissive rule to the same effect, would suffice to establish the jurisdictional legality of the Eichmann trial in public international law.
But even assuming that the Genocide Convention does not expressly or by implication create a rule of international law prescribing or permitting the punishment of acts of genocide committed in World War II, there still remains the final question whether Israel's exercise of criminal jurisdiction in the Eichmann case constitutes a valid exercise of the principle of criminal law enforcement by proxy. This, of course, depends on the compatibility of that jurisdictional principle with public international law.
The question, briefly, is this: does international law permit a state to punish an alien for an offense committed abroad which is punishable both under the law of the place of commission and under the law of the place of prosecution, provided the punishment imposed does not exceed the penalty incurred in the place of commission? The answer can only be in the affirmative. All states are interested in bringing alleged criminals to justicei no state is interested in harboring fugitives from justice. On the other hand, no state is obliged, in the absence of treaty, to extradite persons who are alleged to have committed offenses abroad; the machinery of extradition is rather cumbersome, to say the least5 77 even where states are willing, in the absence of treaty, to effect extradition, formal obstacles such as the lack of diplomatic relations may well prevent or delay the delivery of the person accused. While extradition remains cumbersome and of limited applicability, the answer to the dilemma, at least as between states which have little or no formal preadmission procedures for aliens, is criminal law enforcement by proxy.
Many states have adopted this principle, 8 and at least where there are genuine obstacles to extradition, its compatibility with international law seems recognized by the weight of authority-including the Draft Convention with Respect to Crime, prepared by the Research in International Law of the Harvard Law School in 1935'
In the instant case, the obstacles are real, for while there are official relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel, there are no diplomatic relations, and there is no extradition treaty. Therefore, since Adolf Eichmann cannot readily be extradited by Israel to the Federal Republic of Germany-and since Germany, along with Poland and the Soviet Union, 8 " by approving of Eichmann's trial by Israel, have, in effect, waived extradition-Eichmann can be tried by proxy in Israel.
Even if the Federal Republic of Germany wanted to-or by Eichmann's action in an administrative tribunal, 8 ' were compelled to-object to Israel's exercise of penal jurisdiction over Adolf Eichmann, this objection would fail to affect the legality of the Eichman trial under international law. For the Federal Republic of Germany is all but absolutely precluded from raising objections to any exercise of criminal jurisdiction by proxy. Section four of the German Penal Code expressly provides that German penal law is applicable to offenses committed by an alien abroad, if these offenses are punishable under the law of the place where they were committed, and if, although extradition is in principle permissible for that particular type of offenses, there is, in fact, no extradition. 2 If Germany claims jurisdiction to try an Israeli Eichmann for offenses committed in Israel, Germany cannot fairly object to Israel's claim to jurisdiction to try a German Eichmann for offenses committed in Germany. 13 See supra at notes 41-44. Even if the action was successful, the Federal Republic would in all probability be estopped from exercising its right of diplomatic protection over Eichmann as against Israel, since Israel has, by instituting the criminal trial, changed its position in reliance on Germany's announced decision not to protect. [Vol. x96t : 421
